

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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19 April 1966  
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 19 April 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

(Bulgaria)

OF MICHAEL

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS  
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. M. STAHL  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY  
Mr. M. V. ANTYASSOV  
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALIL  
Mr. A. A. SALAM  
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY  
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON  
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER  
Mr. S. DePALMA  
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD  
Mr. A. F. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. P. P. SPINELLI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I declare open the two hundred and fifty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Today's meeting is one of those which the Committee decided to devote to other collateral measures, and that will be the subject of my statement.

Most of the disarmament or pre-disarmament measures which this Committee is actively considering at present are designed to deal in one way or another with the threat of a nuclear war. That is the purpose of the proposals for a non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1; ENDC/164) and of our efforts to make the nuclear test ban (ENDC/100/Rev.1) comprehensive. It is also the purpose of other partial, initial or collateral measures before us at present, such as the cut-off in production of fissionable material for use in weapons, the destruction of some nuclear weapons, and the freeze on production and the possible destruction of some nuclear weapon vehicles (ENDC/120, 165). As I have said before, the main reason why we are making no progress in our discussions of general and complete disarmament is that there are divergent views on the measures to take for the reduction of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles. In fact, one has to say that there is not likely to be any progress towards nuclear disarmament if we continue merely to try to reconcile the approaches set out in the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted respectively by the United States of America (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) and by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1).

So what is to be done? Our colleagues of the non-aligned countries have been unanimous in affirming that a non-proliferation treaty cannot stand by itself. They say that it should be a step on the road to nuclear disarmament, and that nuclear Powers should undertake to make significant moves towards disencumbering themselves of nuclear weapons and vehicles.

It is now generally recognized, I think, that the problem of balancing the obligations between nuclear Powers and other States which would be imposed by a non-proliferation treaty can be solved only by the eventual adoption of a series of related measures. This has been recognized in a number of documents -- for example the memorandum (ENDC/158) of last September submitted by the non-aligned countries, and several resolutions of the United Nations. Of course, there is no question that such measures should be linked organically one to the other or to a non-proliferation treaty. As the Brazilian representative pointed out on 24 March when speaking about a package of measures:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"In this connexion, perhaps I may be allowed to repeat to my colleagues that my delegation is quite aware that it would not be possible to tie the signature of a non-proliferation treaty to the implementation of the four-point programme of related measures I have presented here." (ENDC/PV.251, p.7)

Nevertheless, it is clear that the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and measures such as those suggested by the representatives of Brazil and other non-aligned nations do have a relation one to the other. In this connexion I should like to quote a few lines from the foreign policy statement of the Swedish Government presented in the Swedish Parliament on 23 March 1966:

"Therefore Sweden supports in Geneva the demand of the non-aligned nations that the great Powers shall give their contribution in the form of a complete test ban and the discontinuance of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. When we set these demands, we do not mean, of course, that we shall start production of nuclear weapons if our demands are not fulfilled. Such a decision has no political actuality in this country. When we insist on commitments in return, this is due to the fact that we want an agreement which constitutes an efficient contribution to the limitation of the nuclear threat in the sense of the United Nations resolution."

The United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, during his testimony on 7 March before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress, agreed that non-proliferation obligations should be balanced by other measures of disarmament or "non-armament". He said:

"The non-nuclear Powers request that the nuclear Powers limit or reduce the level of inventories of nuclear weapons is a meaningful request, and it is one which, if I were in their position, I would make."

Secretary McNamara went on:

"This country has over the past several years on numerous occasions put forward proposals to limit or reduce nuclear arms. I think it is very much in our interest to do so. I think it is very much in the interest of the non-nuclear Powers that we should do so."

The proposals to which Mr. McNamara referred include a freeze on production of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/120) and the suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union should destroy an equal number of bombers (ENDC/PV.176). I do not intend to discuss these proposals today; rather,

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I shall discuss the other important United States proposals for halting continued production of explosive fissile material for nuclear weapons and reducing the existing quantities. I refer to the closely-related proposals for a cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes (ENDC/120); for the transfer to peaceful purposes under international safeguards of large quantities of fissionable material (ENDC/165); and for the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union (ibid.). During this session these proposals have been explained in detail by the United States representatives (ENDC/PV.246, pp.33 et seq.; ENDC/PV.256)

The United States delegation has also taken the trouble to circulate working papers on three aspects of these proposals. One of these (ENDC/134) relates to the inspection of a cut-off of fissionable material and explains clearly what the United States regards as an equitable and non-intrusive verification system. The second working paper (ENDC/172) deals with the transfer of fissionable material obtained by the destruction of nuclear weapons. The third working paper (ENDC/174), circulated only on 14 April, outlines an inspection method for verifying the status of shutdown plutonium production reactors.

Many delegations in this Conference have supported the proposals for a cut-off of production of fissionable material and the destruction of some nuclear weapons. The Canadian delegation has noted the statements made by the representative of Burma (ENDC/PV.250, pp.28, 29), by the representative of Brazil (ENDC/PV.251, pp.7 et seq.), and by the representative of Sweden (ENDC/PV.247, pp.13 et seq.). The representative of Burma said:

"We therefore share the conviction of other non-aligned delegations that agreements on the cut-off of the production of fissionable material of weapons grade and on a comprehensive test ban treaty are the least that should be expected from the nuclear Powers as evidence of their sincerity and determination to deal with the intra-national aspects of proliferation."  
(ENDC/PV.250; p.29)

The cut-off would be particularly valuable as a step by nuclear Powers to parallel obligations undertaken by non-nuclear States in a non-proliferation treaty; it would prohibit the production of further quantities of fissionable material for use in nuclear warheads. The verification necessary would be parallel to the safeguards which should form part of a non-proliferation treaty. But despite the interest of many

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

delegations in this proposal the Soviet Union representative, in his remarks at the meeting on 14 April (ENDC/PV.256, pp. 26, 27), refused to consider it seriously, just as Mr. Tsarapkin had already done at our meeting on 8 March. Mr. Tsarapkin had asserted that the proposal was unacceptable because it would not "really rid the peoples of the threat of a nuclear war"; it did "not achieve this aim", nor was it "intended to do so" (ENDC/PV.246, p.28).

In the view of the Canadian delegation, this sort of criticism is inapplicable; it evades the issue. It is like criticizing medical teams that use DDT because they are not draining the marshes in which the mosquitoes breed. We have agreed in this Committee that our work should be divided between the discussion of general and complete disarmament and the discussion of so-called collateral measures, or measures aimed at reducing tension, lessening the danger of war and opening the road to more extensive measures of disarmament. We thought it was agreed here that the only way finally to rid the world of the threat of a nuclear war was through general and complete disarmament. The United States proposals to which I am referring are, of course, collateral measures. It is not logical to criticize a collateral measure because it will not do what can only be done by general and complete disarmament.

The representative of the Soviet Union said, at the end of his remarks criticizing the United States proposal:

"... the Soviet Government proposes that the nuclear Powers consider the question of the immediate implementation of a programme relating to nuclear disarmament. Such disarmament ... should provide for the destruction under proper international control of all stocks of nuclear weapons accumulated by the States, the prohibition of their production, the complete destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the prohibition of their production ... " (ENDC/PV.256, p.27)

But surely this is part of the Soviet Union programme for general and complete disarmament in the first and second stages. Incidentally, it says nothing about the "Gromyko umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). Are we to understand that the Soviet Union delegation is seriously proposing such a programme as a "collateral measure" prior to general and complete disarmament?

The representative of the Soviet Union went on to say:

"Only such measures, and not the removal of merely a few atomic and hydrogen bombs from the huge stocks accumulated by States, can rid the peoples of the world of the threat of a nuclear war." (ENDC/PV.256, p.27)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

This is another manifestation of the "all or nothing" line which the Soviet Union representatives have taken in answering United States proposals for collateral measures. The Canadian delegation has pointed out that such an attitude is bound to make these disarmament negotiations sterile. We cannot believe that Soviet Union representatives here, and those who deal with disarmament problems in Moscow, do not realize that progress towards disarmament must be achieved by steps, and that it is not going to come about by a "great leap forward", to quote a term with which representatives of the socialist countries are doubtless familiar -- as they are also doubtless familiar with the proven error of the concept to which this slogan referred. Therefore the Canadian delegation hopes that the representatives of the Soviet Union will not go on replying to such proposals as "Let us destroy a considerable number of bombers" by saying: "We will not destroy some bombers, but let us destroy all bombers"; and to the proposal "Let us eliminate some nuclear weapons and some fissile material from the warlike stock-piles" by saying: "We will not do anything of that kind unless all nuclear weapons are eliminated."

Soviet Union representatives have also criticized the proposals for cutting off the production of explosive fissile material because, they say, these proposals would constitute "control without disarmament". There certainly would have to be verification, or control, over the implementation of these measures. Representatives of the United States have explained on several occasions the procedures, requiring only very limited intrusion of international inspectors, which could assure the world that an agreement to cease the production of fissile material for war purposes was being kept.

As we understand it, in addition to the argument -- with which I have just dealt -- that the measure for a cut-off of production does not go far enough, the Soviet Union representatives argue that the required inspection would prejudice their national security. Presumably this can mean only that if the locations of Soviet Union plants for the production of fissile material were known they would be subject to immediate destruction if there were a nuclear war. But do the authorities of the Soviet Union really believe that the locations of these plants are a secret now? And do they believe that even if some of those locations were still secret, and if there were a nuclear war, it would be of any significance to the outcome of that war whether such plants were or were not able to continue to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons?



(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Both United States and Soviet Union military authorities have stated a number of times that they possess enough nuclear explosive, and the means for delivering it, to enable them to destroy the other super-Power; and they have admitted that in a nuclear war they themselves would suffer almost irreparable damage. When we must contemplate that kind of war, does it make any sense to refuse to take a step -- an important first step -- away from such a possibility because of military preoccupations with secrecy, which might have been valid before 6 August 1945? Today the obsession with secrecy which blocks some paths of progress towards disarmament is an unfortunate example of the inability of certain types of military men to learn anything new after they have reached the age of thirty.

In this Committee we have frequently had the occasion to congratulate the representatives of the Soviet Union on that country's great scientific feats in the exploration of outer space -- the cosmos. It has been a progression from one step, one experience to another. The Canadian delegation sincerely hopes that one day we shall be able to congratulate the Soviet Union delegation on a break-through in their thinking about how to get moving towards disarmament, in which they will apply the same realism and objective weighing of facts to this question as their scientists have applied to the exploration of the cosmos.

Mr. Tsarapkin at our meeting on 8 March (ENDC/PV.246, pp.28, 29) and Mr. Roshchin at our meeting on 14 April (ENDC/PV.256, p.27) also criticized the United States proposal that it and the Soviet Union should each destroy 1,000 nuclear weapons and transfer the fissionable material released thereby to peaceful purposes under safeguards. This fissionable material would be part of the 60,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms which the United States proposes that it and the Soviet Union respectively should divert from warlike to peaceful purposes. Mr. Tsarapkin said that this proposal would result, not in the reduction of stocks of weapons, but merely in the replacement of old-fashioned models by more modern ones and "in considerably larger quantities" (ENDC/PV.246, p.28). It is hard to understand this kind of criticism. It would seem to be perfectly clear that if the nuclear Powers halted production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and then destroyed a large number of nuclear weapons -- whether obsolescent or just off the production line -- and transferred the fissionable material released thereby to peaceful purposes, they would be taking a large step toward reducing nuclear stockpiles.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

As Mr. Foster observed on 14 April (ENDC/PV.256, p.13), if the Soviet Union is not satisfied with this proposal, there is no reason why it should not suggest that larger amounts of fissionable materials should be converted. But an argument that destruction of 1,000 nuclear weapons is not disarmament seems to the Canadian delegation to be untenable. If destruction of 1,000 nuclear weapons is not disarmament, then what is disarmament? The assertion cannot be justified by merely saying that such weapons might be obsolescent. A nation's nuclear stockpile at any given time presumably includes a whole range of nuclear weapons, some obviously more modern than others. Not to take into consideration those nuclear weapons that might be called obsolescent is to ignore the death and destruction that such weapons could still cause if discharged. Let us say that each of the 2,000 bombs would have, on average, the same power as the atomic bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima -- a bomb which killed some 71,000 people and injured about 68,000 more, according to Japanese statistics. Multiply the above figures by 2,000, and then ask yourselves whether the destruction of weapons with the potential of causing that many casualties would mean nothing.

But there is a factor even more important than the physical elimination of nuclear weapons capable of causing casualties on the scale indicated by this rough calculation -- that is, that a great upsurge of hope would be created everywhere if the great nuclear Powers demonstrated that they were actually beginning the process of nuclear disarmament by dismantling a part of the apparatus which imposes fear in every part of the world

What would the conversion of 100,000 kilograms of fissile material from warlike to peaceful uses mean? If one takes the amount of such material in a nuclear weapon as being ten kilograms on the average, theoretically this would mean that 10,000 nuclear weapons would not be manufactured. We have just made a rough calculation of what the 2,000 nuclear weapons which the United States wants to see destroyed could do in sowing death and destruction; if these figures are multiplied by five, representatives can on the same basis estimate the importance of the proposal to prevent the possibility of creating another 10,000 weapons.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In the view of the Canadian delegation these collateral measures proposed by the United States on which I have spoken are realistic and practical. Given goodwill, they could be negotiated and agreed upon quickly. They would stop the production of further explosive material for weapons of mass destruction and begin the process of dismantling the weapons themselves.

We hope to hear comments from other delegations on these proposals. At the same time, we would ask the Soviet Union representative to reconsider his position on them. They could go a long way toward slowing down and eventually halting the arms race. Moreover, they are clearly of interest not only to nuclear Powers but also to the vastly more numerous non-nuclear States, including those represented in this Committee.

Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): In view of the fact that future meetings will be devoted to other questions, I should like to speak briefly today on collateral measures.

The Czechoslovak delegation has expressed its views on this subject on a number of previous occasions and has given detailed explanations of its attitude towards individual points. Nevertheless, it may be useful to draw attention once again to the fact that it is high time to take a concrete step forward in the consideration of collateral measures. There are many such measures from which we can choose. They came into being as remedies for certain painful disorders in the world of today. They have been elaborated and proposed in order to contribute to an improvement of the present international situation and a relaxation of existing tensions. Their purpose is to improve, at least partially and in a certain direction, the present state of affairs in the world and to contribute to the solution of some urgent partial problems. They have been designed to answer the needs and requirements of the day and to facilitate the creation of more favourable conditions for genuine progress on the road to disarmament. In other words, they are an expression and a product of a certain situation, which they should help to change for the better.

Most of the proposed measures are permanent in nature and may be useful at any particular time, since the disorders they are designed to cure are deeply rooted in present international political life. However, the circumstances which have an impact on the existence of these measures necessarily change, and new and unexpected difficulties often arise in making adjustments to those circumstances.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

That is particularly evident in questions which undergo dynamic developments and which, at a certain stage and under certain conditions, would be fraught with the danger of our coming to a point of no return, to a milestone which, if passed, would make it substantially more difficult to solve the issues before us. This is clear to everyone in connexion with, for example, the proposed measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Nobody would deny that if effective measures on this question are not adopted in due time we may miss the right opportunity and it will then probably be more difficult to prevent undesirable consequences on the same basis and with the same means as are possible under present conditions.

The same consideration may be applied -- although obviously to a greater or lesser extent -- to other partial measures as well, to steps whose urgency is, evident and indisputable. It is sufficient to refer to the proposal (ENDC/77) to conclude a non-aggression pact between the States members of the Warsaw Pact and those of NATO, to the initiative taken in the matter of creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), and to a number of other useful measures which proceed from the basis of the realities of the day and which require decisions at the time when the conditions for the solution of these problems still exist. In most cases these are projects the usefulness of which has been recognized by a number of countries directly concerned and which often need no more than goodwill and a determination to approach, step by step, the primary objective of our endeavours: general and complete disarmament.

As regards the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two military alignments: as long as three years ago the States members of NATO undertook to hold consultations on this proposal and on the possibility of reaching an agreement acceptable to all parties concerned (ENDC/101). However, they have not so far made public the results of their consultations. Such a pace in reaching solutions to questions under consideration certainly does not correspond to the urgency and significance of these questions. The proposed solutions often touch upon principles that would have a positive and marked impact on the prevailing international situation and would encourage both sides in equal measure to take such steps as would change for the better the unsatisfactory state of affairs.

Here also, as is usually the case, it does not pay to miss the right moment. We have seen recently that the disregarding of the proposal of the USSR Government to reduce and freeze military budgets (ENDC/123) has been accompanied by a steady

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

growth in expenditures for armaments. In connexion with its acts of intervention and open aggression in Viet-Nam, the United States is allocating ever-increasing funds to military purposes, thus again fomenting the arms race.

Similarly, the demand for the elimination of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of the foreign troops stationed at these bases (ibid.) to which the representative of the Soviet Union referred to in detail on 14 April (ENDC/PV.256, pp.18 et seq.) should not be systematically ignored. Naturally, this also applies to the creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world. The significance of this measure has been stressed by various delegations many times in the past. Any delay in solving these problems usually makes the achievement of a satisfactory agreement more difficult and may lead to further complications in the situation.

We feel that much time has been devoted to the consideration of individual proposals for specific partial measures which have been on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament since the very beginning of its work, and that the efforts we have exerted in our discussions should be reflected in concrete results so that we do not once again leave Geneva with empty hands. We cannot draw ad infinitum on the credit which has been granted us by the nations with expect some results from our work; we should at least pay the basic interest on this credit. In this context we cannot but express our full agreement with the representative of Sweden, who said in her statement on 14 April:

"When we recall our United Nations assignment it is evident that we have no right to work solely on one possibility, the prospect of concluding a non-proliferation agreement." (ibid., p.9)

Even though the question of non-proliferation obviously has priority in this case, a whole series of other proposals for effective measures has been at our disposal for a number of years, and these should be translated into reality as soon as possible. In addition to those I have mentioned there are other proposals which urgently demand our attention. These include questions of such significance as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the undertaking by nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In addition, there is the question of supplementing the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) by a ban on all nuclear weapon tests without exception; such a ban would amount to a halt in the perfecting and development of these weapons. Last, but not least, proposals have been made for the prevention of surprise attack and for a reduction in the number of armed forces.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

Unlike the actions proposed by the United States demanding broad, inadequate control in connexion with steps that would not lead to real disarmament -- and control is acceptable only in the achievement of radical disarmament measures in the framework of general and complete disarmament -- , all the measures I have referred to are very feasible, given good will. They do not require any complicated inspections. They do not affect in any way the security of individual States. They would have a positive effect on the normalization of the situation in the world. They would broaden the sphere of international confidence. They would put an end to feverish arming. They would facilitate consolidation of the peace, which is at present unstable.

We are recalling these facts, well known to all of us, only because we regard the time given to us as limited, because we feel it is getting shorter mercilessly while we do not make even a tiny step forward in our work. Without being pessimistic, we cannot disregard the fact that in the course of our deliberations we face the danger of reaching an impasse in the field of collateral measures also.

The Western Powers have via facti buried the prospects of successful consideration of the proposal for general and complete disarmament, asserting that this is a long-term matter for the distant future. We have focussed attention in our discussions on partial measures which might be more easily acceptable and more feasible. It is highly urgent that we should make progress at least in this sphere.

So far, however, this has not been the case. On the contrary, time and again we have witnessed artificial barriers being placed in our way in the consideration also of individual concrete measures that have the full support of the majority of countries and in most cases have been recommended by various United Nations General Assembly resolutions. As is the case with general and complete disarmament, these barriers are blocking all our efforts and thus thwarting the adoption of realistic, useful proposals to the substance of which there can be no objection in any respect. In our discussions here we are often presented with quasi-technical aspects aimed at replacing the political decisions, on which success primarily depends and which are decisive for the achievement of progress, by seemingly technical studies and scientific analyses that would put off ad infinitum the final adoption of appropriate instruments.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

Under these circumstances we felt it to be our duty to express our position on the consideration of collateral measures in more general terms, without dwelling on the well-known details connected with the consideration of individual questions.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): It happens that our meeting today coincides with the reconvening in Mexico City of the Preparatory Commission which is drafting a treaty to maintain Latin America as a nuclear-free zone. The initiative of the Latin-American countries in seeking a Latin-American nuclear-free zone is an outstanding example of regional activity to limit and control armaments. My Government fully supports that effort. It illustrates the constructive possibilities open to groups of countries when they co-operate in making a joint assessment of their national and regional security needs.

In our discussions of late we have concentrated mainly on halting and turning back the nuclear arms race. This is, of course, as it should be. The United Nations has asked us to give priority to negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty, and we are doing so. In President Johnson's message (ENDC/165) to this Committee on 27 January, the first six of his seven proposals deal with nuclear measures. At our last meeting (ENDC/PV.256, pp. 11 et seq.) I elaborated new means of verification for a cut-off in production of fissionable material and the destruction of nuclear weapons.

However, our proper emphasis on nuclear measures should not deter us from coming to grips with the problems of controlling conventional armaments. The seventh point of the programme proposed by President Johnson suggests a line of action for making progress in this area. The President said:

"... as we focus on nuclear arms, let us not forget that resources are being devoted to non-nuclear arms races all around the world. These resources might better be spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick and teaching the uneducated. The cost of acquiring and maintaining one squadron of supersonic aircraft diverts resources that would build and maintain a university. We suggest therefore that countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige. The initiative for arrangements of this kind should, of course, come from the regions concerned. The interested countries should undertake not to acquire from any source, including production of their own as well as importation from others,

(Mr. Foster, United States)

military equipment which they proscribe. If such arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands ready to respect them." (ENDC/165, p.3)

We often use the phrase "conventional armaments" as a means of distinguishing them from nuclear armaments. However, there is nothing conventional about the death and destruction which can be inflicted by modern combat aircraft. They are capable of delivering enormous loads of rockets and bombs. Nor is there anything conventional about the havoc that can be created by a modern tank designed for offensive warfare, or by modern naval vessels.

These and other so-called conventional weapons have resulted in the loss of millions of lives. Over 8 million were killed in the First World War, over 22 million in the Second World War, and hundreds of thousands since the end of the Second World War. No one can question the vital importance of making progress in controlling conventional arms.

If progress can be made, the benefits of increased security will accrue to both the smaller countries and the larger countries. Both have suffered greatly as a result of the conflicts of this **century**. The universal responsibility for arms control was summed up on 11 May 1965 at New York by the Nigerian representative to the Disarmament Commission. His wise words should be repeated:

"At this point, we wish to underline the fact that the elimination of the armaments race is not a duty of the major Powers alone. The major Powers possess the most dangerous armaments, both in type and in quantity, and it is they who should give the lead in effecting reductions. But the medium and small Powers have a similar duty. There are countries in these categories which are making things awkward for themselves, awkward for their neighbours and awkward for the world by an arms build-up out of proportion to their legitimate security requirements." (DC/PV.78, p.22)

The aim of this Committee is, of course, to consider measures which will increase the security of States and enhance international stability. Accordingly we shall wish to keep in mind any special military situations in various parts of the world. Some smaller countries are confronted by serious threats. Indeed, some countries have been subjected to external aggression. These countries, unfortunately, have been forced to make sacrifices in order to strengthen their defence establishments. On the other hand, some countries which have recently achieved independence are only now determining the extent of the military establishments which will be needed for their security. We do not suggest -- indeed it would not be proper to suggest --



(Mr. Foster, United States)

that countries should set low levels for their defence establishments without regard to security. Legitimate security needs must be met. Responsible officials will and should strive to acquire the armaments needed, but only the armaments needed, to meet those legitimate security requirements.

Regional and international peace is endangered, however, when nations seek armaments or weapons systems beyond their defence needs. Regrettably, an arms race can be set off by acquisition of weapons of excessive range or power. Whether such arms are acquired because of an inaccurate national security assessment or because of prestige considerations, other nations in the region will, as a result, feel pressure to acquire the same or similar weapons. Obviously an arms race of this type would create a tragic and unnecessary drain on resources badly needed for development. For many countries the exciting and challenging tasks of social, industrial and agricultural growth are just beginning. These tasks should not be impeded by the burdens of spending for unnecessary armaments.

For its part, the United States has pursued as a fundamental objective the promotion of economic and social development throughout the world. It has contributed billions of dollars to the economic and social efforts of other States. I feel confident that our willingness and ability to assist other countries seeking our help will continue. Regarding future assistance, I should like to repeat the statement which I made on 17 May 1965 before the United Nations Disarmament Commission. I said:

"... in providing future assistance, the United States will continue to regard favourably efforts by the countries concerned to avoid excessive armament undertakings which would interfere with ... social and economic development." (DC/PV.82, p.31)

In the search for regional co-operation to limit armaments certain principles might serve as a guide.

First, the arrangement should contain an undertaking by the affected countries not to acquire from any source, whether indigenous production or importation, those types of military equipment which they agree to regulate. These would include the types of equipment that the participants decided were not required to meet their security needs, after taking into account the effect of the arrangements on other nations in the region. Restrictions would have to be placed on production as well as importation. It would serve little purpose if a country agreed to forgo importation of certain military equipment while at the same time it undertook to

(Mr. Foster, United States)

manufacture such equipment. Nor would a regional arms race be averted if a country within the region agreed to forgo production of certain costly military equipment but then imported it from supplier nations.

Second, the initiative for an arrangement should come from within the region concerned. We have already seen that constructive initiatives in regional arms control are possible. This Committee cannot itself work out measures for particular regions. It can, however, provide encouragement and support. Such support might be furnished by discussing principles such as the ones I am suggesting today.

A third guiding principle is that the arrangements should include all States in the region whose participation is deemed important by the other participants. An arrangement could apply, as agreed by the participants, to either an entire region, a sub-region or any two or more countries in the region.

Fourth, potential suppliers should undertake to respect the regional arrangement by not supplying the proscribed types of equipment to the affected countries. Suppliers would, of course, be free to continue to assist in the economic development of the affected countries. They could supply equipment of types not proscribed and render other types of support and assistance deemed necessary to meet the defence and internal security arrangements of the affected countries.

Fifth, the arrangement should contribute to the security of the States concerned and to the maintenance of a stable military balance. This principle should assist in guarding against any possible attempts to use regional arrangements to undermine existing security arrangements, contrary to the wishes of the States concerned. In addition, the arrangement should contain enough flexibility to permit adjustment to major changes in the political-military environment.

Sixth, adequate provision should be made for satisfying all interested parties that the arrangement is being respected.

Although I have suggested several principles which might guide the development of regional arrangements for limiting conventional armaments, one in particular should be emphasized. This is the principle that initiatives for regional arrangements should come from within the region concerned. Acceptance of this principle will best ensure that special regional security problems, of the sort I have already mentioned, will be taken fully into account. This principle also contributes to the realization of the aims and aspirations of the countries concerned.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Regional initiatives present an opportunity for those countries to play a leading role in the attainment of basic arms control objectives. And the realization of such initiatives could enhance the security of the region as well as of the rest of the world. It could reduce regional tensions, promote the constructive utilization of economic resources, and contribute to the ultimate achievement of general disarmament.

The United States stands ready to co-operate to the fullest in implementing regional arms control arrangements. It recognizes the difficulties involved, but the potential benefits of regional arms limitations call for renewed efforts to achieve this goal.

President Johnson has summarized the benefits as follows:

"It can be a world where nations raise armies, where famine and disease and ignorance are the common lot of men, where the poor nations look on the rich with envy, bitterness and frustration; where the air is filled with tension and hatred.

"Or it can be a world where each nation lives in independence, seeking new ways to provide a better life for its citizens; a world where the energies of its restless peoples are directed toward the works of peace; a world where people are free to build a civilization to liberate the spirit of man."

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): My delegation attaches particular importance to what we have just heard: Mr. Foster's statement on the seventh point of President Johnson's message (ENDC/165). In this connexion I should first of all like to associate myself with Mr. Foster's appreciation of the renewed efforts of the Latin-American countries to denuclearize their continent, and I should like to express to the representatives of Latin America in this Conference my very sincere wishes that their efforts may be crowned with complete success, satisfactory to their countries and to the requirements of peace. We in Italy shall be the first to rejoice at such success and shall consider it a gain to the entire world.

I should also like to single out two elements in Mr. Foster's speech which struck me particularly and are fully supported by my delegation. The first is the importance which the Head of the United States delegation has once again ascribed to conventional disarmament. This is a point which my delegation has often stressed, for we believe that if disarmament is to be effective it must be balanced in the two fields, conventional and nuclear.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Secondly, I should like to express my delegation's complete agreement and full support in regard to the relationship, the link, which -- as Mr. Foster emphasized -- exists between disarmament and the requirements of economic and social progress in all countries, and especially the developing countries. It would be absurd if countries which need all their resources for the satisfaction of their essential needs should squander them in an arms race. Similarly, I feel that countries whose essential needs are satisfied should co-operate through disarmament economies in a joint effort to create a better life for all.

In the seventh point of his message President Johnson issued a very important appeal which I hope will be heeded. This appeal is addressed, I believe, to all; it contains guidelines for all, and it is to be hoped that all will co-operate in preventing local arms races which, though limited, would be ruinous and dangerous.

My delegation would also like today to speak on other collateral measures, and in general on the approach, the method, which we feel should be adopted in elaborating collateral measures. I believe our Committee unanimously agrees that the drafting of treaties on certain partial measures of disarmament would be the quickest, least difficult and most concrete method of attaining our aims, gradually building confidence, and consolidating peace.

It is in the sphere of such measures that we took the first step towards disarmament: the partial ban on nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The ceaseless efforts of this Committee to achieve an agreement in this sphere finally led to this encouraging result. Now the Committee is concentrating its efforts on non-dissemination, the discussion of which we shall soon be resuming.

The experience of the Moscow Treaty teaches us that only by multiplying our efforts to achieve a specific objective, and by mobilizing world public opinion, especially in the General Assembly of the United Nations, can we overcome all difficulties with the exercise of patience and without being discouraged by the opposition and the delaying tactics of the Soviet delegation.

But it seems to me appropriate that this Committee, while not losing sight of the principal objective of this session, a non-dissemination agreement, should also devote its attention to other possibilities, to other collateral measures, some of which are in a very advanced stage of elaboration. Once again my delegation wishes to repeat

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

that we must seek the easiest and quickest way to achieve concrete and tangible agreements, remembering that, in accordance with recommendations of the United Nations, these agreements should restore confidence and initiate a process of social and economic betterment throughout the world.

If we consider under these two aspects the various proposals for collateral measures submitted so far, our attention should be concentrated on those which can provide tangible evidence of mutual good faith and make it possible to release forthwith for productive and humanitarian purposes the resources at present being swallowed up in the arms race.

What does the man in the street want first and foremost? What does he ask for? A halt in the arms race, and at the same time the preservation of his own security. That is the first obligatory step of any disarmament process. We have repeated this axiomatic truth a thousand times, but it still does not seem to have been accepted by all. To be sure, the ideal would be a halt in the production of all weapons, but we know too well the difficulties involved in such a drastic step. We must therefore content ourselves initially with a halt in the production of certain specified types of weapon.

This fact, this inexorable need to limit a freeze at the beginning to certain sectors raises, we admit, problems of balance; for a halt in production in one sector but not in others could entail advantages or disadvantages for a particular country. If, however, we could at least agree on the principle that freezes are necessary and constitute the first condition of any further progress in disarmament, it should not be impossible to determine by common agreement those sectors where freezes would not entail imbalance or danger.

That is so true that in the Moscow Treaty one such sector was actually identified and agreement reached without detriment to anyone's security. In the hope of achieving some progress, the West has for years been proposing a continuation of the freezing process initiated by the Moscow Treaty, and has urged a standstill in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. The Soviet objection to such a step, that it would be useless since present stocks of fissionable materials are already so large, is not convincing. By following that line of argument we should have to conclude that, since the world is already saturated with weapons of all types, a general halt in the arms race would itself be completely useless.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The West has also proposed other freezing measures which have been rejected by the Soviet delegation, but we shall not let ourselves be discouraged by that. On the contrary, we invite the Soviet delegation to tell us in what fields it would accept steps to freeze arms production. There must be such fields, even one field, in which the Soviet Union would not regard a freezing measure as harmful to its interests and security.

What I ask is that with Soviet participation we should amplify the discussion on a halt in the arms race through a freeze in production in certain specified fields. If this discussion were widened, we might then find other sectors than that of tests in the three environments where interests did not clash and where we could begin to envisage the conclusion of an agreement. Naturally I do not forget that any freezing measure calls for guarantees. However, the application of a freezing measure in a particular and necessarily limited sector is only the beginning, the first step, in a disarmament process. It would therefore be only right that the required guarantees should not be too extensive and should not compromise the secrecy of other sectors remaining outside a freeze or that of a country's military organization as a whole.

Thus, in seeking sectors lending themselves to freeze agreements, we must also bear in mind the need for secrecy by giving preference to those sectors where guarantees could be more easily given and accepted on both sides. But, apart from these direct and immediate guarantees which are necessary and inevitable, there could also be an indirect and supplementary guarantee. This could easily be obtained if the Committee accepted the Italian delegation's view -- shared by certain other delegations here -- that economies achieved through the adoption of collateral measures should be used to promote social and economic progress in developing countries.

A halt in arms production in no matter what sector would lead to economies. The use of these for humanitarian ends would guarantee that the reduction in the military effort in one sector would not be compensated in another sector. The change-over to humanitarian activities would prove that there had indeed been a reduction in the military effort -- indirect supplementary proof, but nevertheless valid proof.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Moreover, what measure should follow immediately after a halt in the arms race? If we again ask the man in the street, he would surely call for the physical destruction of some weapons. Indeed, what clearer proof could there be that disarmament had truly begun than to see the controlled destruction of certain weapons? What other step would more effectively provide psychological stimulus and revive confidence? Our entire negotiations are based on the extreme dangers of atomic bombs. We have heard day in day out, here and in the United Nations, speeches on the unparalleled destructive capacity of one, even the smallest, of these death-dealing devices.

We have before us a concrete proposal for the immediate elimination of a large number of these bombs. That is not a rigid proposal, since it provides for, and even invites, counter-proposals which might be of even greater scope. As you know, this proposal would, in accordance with the criteria which I have just listed, enable us to release for peaceful uses very large quantities of fissionable materials. This proposal cannot be dismissed merely by saying that it is inadequate, and that a very large number of nuclear bombs would remain in stock. That is a feeble and unconvincing argument. We cannot ignore that it would be of the greatest benefit to world peace if some nuclear devices were to be destroyed by common agreement.

We must also bear in mind another aspect of this proposal for destroying bombs. The Soviet delegation has often expressed its aversion to the percentage method of reduction; it prefers the quantitative method. But in this proposal before us the quantitative method is adopted, with a disproportion which is definitely in favour of the Soviet Union. That is a precedent which, without prejudice of course to the methods to be adopted in the future for other measures, should be accepted by the Soviet delegation with satisfaction and alacrity.

The measures and proposals to which I have just alluded would constitute tangible and concrete proof of goodwill on both sides. It is through such measures that confidence can be rebuilt without undermining anybody's security. These are limited, easy and concrete measures which do not touch on fundamental or extremely complicated problems, measures which do not in any way curtail freedom of association between nations for mutual defence, measures which are more than mere declarations or intent or reaffirmations of peaceful aspirations.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I naturally do not want to belittle the value of conciliatory declarations and of words inspired by mutual goodwill. Unfortunately, we did not hear many such words in the Soviet representative's speech of 14 April (ENDC/PV.256). Mr. Roshchin spoke at length about, among other matters, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the liquidation of so-called foreign bases. I am sure that Mr. Roshchin is aware of what my delegation had said on this subject in past sessions, especially on the importance of the geographical factor to the Western Alliance. I do not want to waste the Committee's time by repeating these arguments, but I wish to remind the Soviet delegation that not long ago, in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York, it saw fit to withdraw a draft resolution against foreign bases which it had previously submitted. I am sure that it withdrew this resolution out of a laudable desire to be conciliatory, and not merely because it had realized that the draft resolution would not obtain a majority in the Commission.

Our work here must continue to be based on the guidelines laid down for us by the United Nations and on the wishes expressed by the majority of the General Assembly, which in our opinion deliberately refrained from insisting on the elaboration here in Geneva of unrealistic collateral measures which would divide us instead of bringing us together. The Italian delegation, for its part, will continue to seek ways of reducing the distances between us and conducting to effective and concrete work.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): I should like to make a very brief speech today on the problem of collateral measures, in the context of the question which has been our chief preoccupation since we resumed our labours in January: the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The results which we have achieved so far in this field call for serious reflection. I believe we have a right to ask the following question: what is the point of examining the various collateral measures submitted to our consideration if we cannot surmount the difficulties or smooth over the differences standing in the way of the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement? As I see it, the main reason for our disagreements with our Western colleagues on most of the matters



(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

under discussion is essentially political, and derives from a difference in our appraisals of the international situation and in our judgment of the part which certain collateral measures could and should play in improving the international atmosphere.

There are two approaches to the problems before us. One is to concentrate resolutely on a reduction in tension and seek to evaluate the various measures proposed in the light of their possible contribution to the attainment of this objective. An improvement in international relations is accepted as desirable and feasible, and collateral measures are to contribute to the achievement of that aim. It is held that such an improvement in the general atmosphere would enable us to see the problem in a new light and would facilitate the search for solutions acceptable to all.

The other approach assumes the cold war and its continuation to be a constant factor in international life. The collateral measures proposed are based on that assumption. They do not seek to modify the international climate by direct action. They avoid a confrontation with the main difficulties. They confine themselves to marginal problems. Collateral measures of a political nature are eschewed. Preference is given to proposals which do not entail modifications in the military capacity of the Powers. Any step towards a change in the international climate, towards true disarmament, is subordinated to certain prior political conditions, although these are known to be unacceptable. The tension, the distrust which it engenders, and the resulting arms race are regarded as indispensable elements in the continuation of the policy based on positions of strength, which it is not desired to renounce, in the hope of compelling the other side to make concessions.

For its part, the Polish delegation favours the first approach. Our determination to reach agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and our desire to see progress in our search for an agreement on collateral measures both stem from the same objectives: to slow down the arms race, to avoid acts likely to increase tension and foster distrust, to act directly on the most sensitive sectors by concrete measures which could if applied have immediate effects,

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

and to base international relations not on the balance of strength or the balance of terror but on the balance of security. Even if the political application of these concepts, in the view of some, entail certain risks, these are certainly trifling compared with the dangers of continuing the present state of affairs.

The Polish delegation has always sought, in the examination of certain collateral measures, a harmony, a balance between the contemplated political and military measures. We also feel that the geographical factor must be considered and action taken to influence the situation in those regions which are of especial importance for the maintenance of world peace.

In this connexion it seems to us that Europe merits very special attention. Europe is and will remain one of the most sensitive areas in the world. The application of a series of collateral measures affecting our continent can thus exercise a profound influence on the international situation as a whole.

The strengthening of European security has always been one of the main concerns of my Government's foreign policy. We favour the convening of a conference of all the countries concerned to discuss the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe. We also hold that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries would render a great service to the cause of European security. It is self-evident that a system of security in Europe cannot be based on discrimination against any particular State. All European countries must benefit equally from the establishment of such a system, and all must enjoy in equal measure the guarantees provided.

The Polish delegation believes that the political steps which I have just mentioned would gain considerably in effectiveness if they were completed by a series of measures directed to halting the arms race and to reducing the concentration of weapons -- especially nuclear weapons -- in Europe. We believe that the practical effects of all these measures, political and military, would not be long in making themselves felt. A reduction in tension in Europe, which would be accompanied by a strengthening of the feeling of security, would create an atmosphere favourable to a reduction in the burden of armaments. Certain doctrines in vogue and certain currently-applied military policies would be seen in a new light. Their revision would then appear as a normal and logical consequence of the new state of affairs.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Polish delegation holds that central Europe should be the subject of a serious effort to reduce the danger of war stemming from the concentration of considerable quantities of nuclear weapons in that part of our continent. I do not intend to set forth our views on this subject again, for they are well known. I merely wish to re-affirm our attachment to the idea of creating a denuclearized zone in central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1) and to the proposal which we submitted in 1964 for a "freeze" of nuclear weapons in that area (ENDC/PV.139, p.6). We are willing to discuss with all the countries concerned the problem involved in the implementation of our proposals. We are prepared to examine, in a spirit of goodwill and understanding, any constructive suggestion.

The projects put forward by us have only one aim: that of strengthening security in Europe by effectively reducing the danger of a nuclear conflagration entailed by the concentration of large quantities of nuclear weapons in the heart of our continent. In serving the cause of peace in Europe we believe that we are also serving the cause of peace throughout the world.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have listened with great attention to the Polish representative's speech; but I really must express my surprise at certain of his statements which, coming on the heels of my own speech, appeared to be an answer to my arguments. Mr. Blusztajn spoke of the cold war; he asserted that the collateral measures proposed by the West breathe the spirit of the cold war and aim at the maintenance of tension. Mr. Blusztajn did not make any allusions to my speech; in fact it would have been difficult for him to do so, for nothing that I said could justify such allegations.

What I asked for was the exact opposite of what Mr. Blusztajn seems to be accusing the West. I asked that confidence should be restored, that efforts should be made to reconcile the various points of view, that those efforts should be made through concrete and tangible measures of disarmament, such as those preliminary measures which are absolutely necessary: a halt in the arms race in certain sectors and the destruction of certain weapons, especially bombs. That, as I see it, is the right method -- that is to say, to give concrete and tangible proof of mutual goodwill. And it was for such mutual goodwill that I appealed in my speech.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I call on the representative of Poland in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): The members of the Committee will realize that when I came here to-day I had no idea what the Italian representative, Mr. Cavalletti, was going to say. I do not have the gift of prophecy.

I listened to Mr. Cavalletti's speech with great interest, but I must express my astonishment that he saw fit to engage in polemics with me before studying my statement, as he ought to have done before attempting to answer my arguments. For my part, I shall certainly study Mr. Cavalletti's speech with great attention, and my delegation will no doubt have an opportunity to return to several of the questions raised by him.

On the substance of the problems raised by the Italian representative I shall merely say this: I unfortunately do not see any signs whatever that the Western delegations are making a serious effort to examine objectively the proposals put forward by the delegations of the socialist countries in connexion with collateral measures. I refer especially to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/123, p.3), a proposal that has been on our agenda for many years now. Nor has any serious effort been made to examine the proposals submitted by the Polish Government and known first as the Rapacki Plan, then as the Gomulka Plan.

Why did I say that the proposals of the socialist countries are directed towards a reduction in international tension? It is because I believe that the whole trend of the foreign policy of the socialist countries, based on the doctrine of peaceful co-existence, is directed towards that objective.

Why did I say that the other approach to these problems is based on the assumption of a continuation of the cold war? It is because I believe that the Western Powers -- and international events prove it, alas, nearly every day -- have not renounced their policy based on positions of strength. That is why their proposals do not influence the more sensitive sectors and do not attempt to reduce tension where it is to be found. On the contrary, the Western Powers devote their attention to marginal problems, seeking at times to make political capital out of proposals which, from the aspect of disarmament as such, are of very dubious value.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): As no one else wishes to speak, I shall make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Bulgaria.

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

The Bulgarian delegation also wishes to consider once again some of the collateral measures that have been discussed. The fact is that life, events in the world and the behaviour of individual governments provide us every day with new opportunities of taking our bearings and of assessing more correctly the value, the effectiveness and the urgency of any of the measures proposed. As an example, let us compare the United States proposal for the transfer by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively of 60 and 40 tons of fissionable material to peaceful uses, (ENDC/PV.151, pp.11,12) and the Soviet proposal for the elimination of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops to within their national boundaries (ENDC/123). Which of these proposals is more in keeping with the concrete situation of today? Everyday experience provides the answer.

Whatever may be one's attitude towards the first proposal, the United States proposal, one cannot fail to realize that its implementation would not reduce by one iota the existing dangers to peace. It would not affect to any extent the nuclear potential and stockpiles of the States possessing nuclear weapons. It would in fact be merely a "demonstration", both in form and in content, a demonstration which would, however, divert the Committee from the right path. On the other hand, the implementation of the proposal to eliminate foreign military bases and to withdraw foreign troops therefrom would be, especially in the present circumstances, a decisive step towards the pacification of many areas of the world and towards the elimination of peace-endangering centres of serious conflict.

Such indeed are the considerations that should guide us. What practical contribution any particular measure would make to the safeguarding of peace is now the decisive factor in assessing any solution that is proposed. At this moment in history we are obliged to "take the bull by the horns" -- that is, boldly to propose whatever is likely to halt the trend towards war. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has the duty to take the lead in this endeavour. There are a number of proposals of this kind on our agenda. Many of them, for example the proposal to eliminate foreign military bases and to withdraw foreign troops from the territories of other countries, have the full support of the United Nations, as was also reflected in the resolution on the elimination of all vestiges of colonialism (A/RES/2105(XI)).

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

That resolution did not contain merely a formal embodiment of support for the elimination of foreign military bases. It is backed by the will of all peoples to live independently and in accordance with their own desires. It is also backed by the common sense of most States, by recognition of the great danger which these bases represent.

The last few days have provided new illustrations of what I have just said. Twelve years ago the long-suffering people of Viet-Nam had before them the prospect of an independent and peaceful life. However, in the southern half of the country there were foreign, United States military "advisers" and war material, the owners of which consider that it is for them to decide from across the seas how the Viet-Namese are to live and develop in future. The result is plain to see: the number of "advisers" has increased continuously; little by little they have become a standing army more than 240,000 strong, for whose feeding and upkeep airfields and other bases have been constructed, until it has finally become clear that the mighty United States of America, unrestrained, as the saying goes, by the laws of God or man, is waging a merciless war against an entire people in the desire to impose its will upon it.

Whom in this hall will the representatives of the United States persuade that it is protecting the Viet-Namese against someone or other? Did it not protect Ngo Dinh Diem against his own people and, after Diem, did it not protect other Diems, who were sent to the scrap-heap despite American protection? It is clear to everyone where these actions have led, and it is surely not difficult to foresee to what else they may lead if a stop is not put to them. That is why we consider that the question of the elimination of military bases and of the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories is an urgent matter and one of paramount importance.

The theory that the demand for the elimination of foreign military bases would mean depriving small and weak States of protection and abandoning them to the whim of fate does not stand up to criticism. The weak and the small have sufficient opportunity to obtain the protection they need without having their sovereignty infringed by foreign troops. The strong have so many possibilities of helping the weak, if there is really a need for such help, without laying any claim to their territory and without placing them in a dependent position. The protection of weak and small States should consist, above all, in respecting the Charter of the

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

United Nations. Such protection should be sought in general and complete disarmament, in non-interference in the affairs of others, and in renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of disputes.

If we look at the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee we find there many proposals whose implementation would provide adequate protection for all, big and small alike, against any danger of attack from outside. It appears that there is no need for foreign military bases and troops. The harm which they do is obvious. We must reach agreement on their elimination, especially since the implementation of such a measure would not require any special international machinery to be put into operation. In order to calm and improve the international situation and to create the conditions for further steps towards disarmament, we must first get rid of the nuclear threat and foreign military bases, and withdraw all foreign troops to within their national boundaries. Since it has become even more clear after the incident over the Spanish village of Palomares that United States military bases represent an everyday nuclear danger for many countries, our delegation reaffirms its support for the Soviet proposal (ENDC/PV.241, pp.8,9) that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should call for the cessation of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over foreign territories and the high seas.

The Bulgarian delegation would also like to touch briefly on the proposal for a comprehensive agreement on the banning of nuclear tests: that is, the question of extending the scope of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover underground nuclear tests. It is hardly necessary to mention the urgency and necessity of solving this question. Resolution 2032 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/161) calls upon us to achieve such a solution. Suffice it to say that the banning of all nuclear weapon tests would slow down the arms race and facilitate decisions on a number of measures aimed at nuclear disarmament. It would prevent the nuclear Powers from continuing to carry out extensive programmes aimed at the improvement of nuclear weapons, and would make it difficult if not impossible for the non-nuclear Powers which do not yet possess nuclear weapons to obtain such weapons through their own national production.

The discussion of this problem has shown clearly that its solution is blocked by the position of the Western Powers and especially the United States of America. For many years the United States has been insisting on the necessity of carrying out

(The Chairmen, Bulgaria)

on-site inspection, which is said to be required in order to provide guarantees that a "suspicious event" was not in fact a secret nuclear test. That, in the opinion of the United States, is the cause of the main difficulty in reaching agreement on the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests. It appears that the improvement of seismic detection and identification capabilities brought about in recent years has not had the slightest effect on the United States position. The question of inspection is elevated by the United States to the position of an immutable principle, regardless of the undoubted progress achieved in the detection and identification of seismic phenomena by national monitoring systems which, in the opinion of eminent scientists, makes any on-site inspection absolutely unnecessary.

The statement of the representative of the United States at our meeting of 4 April was particularly revealing in this respect. Mr. Fisher tried once again with the aid of a detailed technical analysis to justify the necessity of carrying out on-site inspection, and gave it to be understood quite categorically that the United States was not even disposed to hear about any other possibilities of solving this question (ENDC/PV.254, pp.16 et seq.). In the opinion of the United States representative -- and this was quite definitely stressed in his statement -- on-site inspection remains the only possibility for exercising control over compliance with the provisions of a treaty banning underground tests. Such an approach in discussing the question of banning underground nuclear weapon tests shows once again that the United States is unwilling to take into consideration the latest achievements of science or the need to seek for and reach agreement on possible solutions to this problem. We can only conclude that, under the pretext of the need for on-site inspection, the United States is in fact concealing the absence of any resolve on its part not to conduct nuclear weapon tests.

As is shown by reports in the Press, in this year alone the United States has already carried out thirteen underground tests, which were part of a programme aimed at the improvement of existing types of nuclear weapons and the development of new types. It is the final fulfilment of this programme -- the end of which is not in sight and depends on the United States alone -- that is preventing the solution of such an important, such an urgent and clear question as the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. We point out this obstacle once again, because only its removal can lead to success in this matter.



(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

There is no doubt that in solving the problems of disarmament we must adopt a universal approach; being guided not only by the interests of a single Power or group of Powers, or of this or that region, but by the interests of all Powers and all regions of the world. This is also our starting-point in considering the range of problems connected with the continent of Europe. As is well known, the political, economic and military interests of the major world Powers are interwoven in Europe. As in the past, Europe is at present a tangle of international contradictions. During the past fifty years the world has lived through two world wars. Both of them started not in some unspecified place, but in Europe.

After the second world war the United States converted Western Europe into its main military and strategic centre. The aggressive NATO military bloc was created on the initiative of the United States, and this compelled the Socialist countries, for their part, to conclude the Warsaw Pact. Powerful groupings of military forces and vast quantities of nuclear weapons are now concentrated in Central Europe, as nowhere else in the world. The United States is continuously increasing its stocks of nuclear weapons in Europe -- a fact which cannot fail to cause concern to the European nations. The peoples of Western Europe are literally living on a nuclear minefield and any spark in this region would touch off a devastating world nuclear war. The region includes Western Germany, a State whose present leaders have declared revanchism as their national policy, and nuclear weapons as the means of achieving the aims of this policy.

There can be no doubt that, once kindled in Europe, the flames of war would inevitably extend beyond its limits and develop into a world nuclear war. That is why there is not a single nation, wherever it may be situated, that is not interested in maintaining peace in Europe. A guarantee of European security would mean to a large extent a guarantee of world security and would avert the danger of a world war.

The socialist countries consider all the questions relating to European security to be extremely important and urgent. These countries have made and are still making a number of proposals which would contribute to the solution of this problem -- such proposals as the creation of denuclearized zones in Central Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean area, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Central Europe or reduction of their numbers, and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the States signatories to the Warsaw Pact (ENDC/123). Such proposals have been included in the Committee's agenda and await solution.

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

The proposals of the Polish People's Republic concerning the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe and the freezing of nuclear weapons in that zone, known as the Rapacki plan and the Gomulka plan which contain formulations of the most urgent tasks, provide for measures of particular importance for the strengthening of European security and world peace. The Governments of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic have expressed their willingness to form part of the denuclearized zone proposed in the Polish draft. There would thus be created in Central Europe a broad zone without nuclear weapons and without missiles or aircraft carriers of nuclear weapons, comprising the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland; this would decisively improve the situation in Europe and would eliminate the threat of nuclear war in this region.

Most States in Europe and in the world have supported this Polish initiative. But the United States and its Western allies have responded to these constructive and reasonable proposals of Poland by increasing the distribution of nuclear weapons in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, by arming this State with the most modern weapons, and by further efforts to give Western Germany access to nuclear weapons.

In January of this year the German Democratic Republic submitted a statement to the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/168) calling on the nuclear Powers to remove nuclear weapons from German territory and to leave these territories free of nuclear weapons in the future. If we compare the attitude of the two German States to questions of this kind, we cannot fail to see the fundamental difference between them. Whereas the German Democratic Republic steadfastly and consistently follows a peaceful course in its relations with other States and takes initiatives aimed at strengthening security in Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany has made revanchism and nuclear armament the main objectives of its policy.

This dangerous political course has once again been confirmed in the Federal Republic of Germany's last "Peaceful Note", as it is called in the West. The proposals contained in that Note show that only the phraseology is changed and the claims of the Federal Republic of Germany remain the same. That Note contains the following principal claims, which no ally of the Federal Republic of Germany can deny; first, the 1937 frontiers; second, an equal share of nuclear responsibility for the Federal

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

Republic of Germany and the other members of NATO, and third, absorption of the German Democratic Republic. What do these claims lead to? What do they mean if not revanchism? In the Committee some of the delegations of the Western countries have apparently made it their business to defend the West German rulers at all costs. But such behaviour is a direct encouragement of that foul policy, whereas the interests of peace require, not that it should be encouraged, but that it should be condemned and resolutely opposed.

The socialist States parties to the Warsaw Pact are constantly making efforts to improve the political atmosphere in Europe and to create a durable system of European security. The significance of measures aimed at ensuring European security has again been stressed in the joint communiqué of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia concerning a meeting of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, published in Belgrade on 14 April, in which it is stated:

"Both parties take a positive view of efforts and initiatives in Europe aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles preventing the general co-operation of European States. The creation of confidence between the peoples of Europe is an important condition for ensuring peace throughout the world.

"The conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and extension of the scope of the Moscow Treaty on the banning of nuclear tests would in the present situation be an important step towards bringing about a beginning of the process of disarmament and towards the creation of the conditions for stable peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

"In the interests of the European peoples and of peace throughout the world the Federal Republic of Germany should not be allowed to gain access in any form to nuclear weapons."

If the Eighteen-Nation Committee were to express itself in favour of the adoption of a series of measures aimed at ensuring European security it would be doing extremely useful work for peace throughout the world and would help in the highest degree towards taking further steps that would lead to a reduction of the arms race and to a relaxation of tension in international relations.

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I regret that I must take the time of the Committee in order to express, more in sorrow than in anger, my disappointment that our Chairman, speaking as the representative of Bulgaria, should have again dredged up a whole series of unsupported charges against the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Unfortunately, he has repeated many things that he has said before. I have time and time again answered those unsupported charges, and I shall not take the Committee's time to do it again today. But I must confess that these charges are particularly disappointing today since the previous speakers have in general approached our problems in a truly constructive manner. We naturally have some differences on some of the points made this morning, but I feel that until these remarks were made by our Chairman we had set a tone of discussion in the Committee which held out some promise of progress.

We shall study all the comments made at this meeting and may want to exercise our right of reply to substantive points made in the previous speeches.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 257th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Carlo Lukanov, representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Italy, Poland and Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 21 April, 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.